Separate out self-service token comments
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@ -22,17 +22,9 @@ with a connector weight (target Reserve Ratio) of 0.25 (25%) and an inital price
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(Note that the 100 Sarafu to 1 xDAI will approximate the Kenyan Shillings to USD rate)
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(Note that the 100 Sarafu to 1 xDAI will approximate the Kenyan Shillings to USD rate)
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## Implementation
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## Implementation
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Each existing user should have a completley new wallet and private key for security reasons and be given the same balances they currently have with the new (xDAI reserve) Sarafu. Roughly 8Million Sarafu_1 in wallet will be replaced with Sarafu_2
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Each existing user should have a completley new wallet and private key for security reasons and be given the same balances they currently have with the new (xDAI reserve) Sarafu. Roughly 8Million Sarafu_1 in wallet will be replaced with Sarafu_2
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### Workflow
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### Workflow
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> lash: what's meant by public and private functions here?
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> lash: private keys: should we take the opportunity of setting up deterministic wallets? perhaps even on the platform we may want to shuffle private keys once in awhile.
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> lash: what is a "facilitator address"?
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1. Synch db <->Blockchain - ensure synronization between our db (USSD interface) and blockchain
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1. Synch db <->Blockchain - ensure synronization between our db (USSD interface) and blockchain
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1. Finalize any contract changes to Bancor Suite (such as [Depth Bump](https://gitlab.com/grassrootseconomics/cic-docs/-/blob/master/spec/003_depth_bump.md))
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1. Finalize any contract changes to Bancor Suite (such as [Depth Bump](https://gitlab.com/grassrootseconomics/cic-docs/-/blob/master/spec/003_depth_bump.md))
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1. Create Public vs Private Functions - Contracts as permissionless as possible
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1. Create Public vs Private Functions - Contracts as permissionless as possible
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@ -28,19 +28,12 @@ the price of the token may shoot up and CIC sell offs will cause the reserve to
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We would need to be able to mint tokens and the reserve outside of the bonding curve in a controled way.
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We would need to be able to mint tokens and the reserve outside of the bonding curve in a controled way.
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The idea would be to keep the CIC price 1:1 with reserve and increase both reserve and supply equally (with the same multiple) (off the curve)
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The idea would be to keep the CIC price 1:1 with reserve and increase both reserve and supply equally (with the same multiple) (off the curve)
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To avoid gaming: Excess tokens created in this process (beyond those minted along the bonding curve) should be given to a specific address designated in the Converter constructor.
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To avoid gaming: Excess tokens created in this process (beyond those minted along the bonding curve) should be given to a specific address designated in the Converter constructor.
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> lash: "specific address in the converter constructor." Is this feasible without changing code? Where else could we put this without changing code? Could contract registry help?
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A donor in this case can choose to always get back as many CICs as they add to reserve - with no speculative advantage.
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A donor in this case can choose to always get back as many CICs as they add to reserve - with no speculative advantage.
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## Implementation
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## Implementation
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### Workflow
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### Workflow
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> lash: this must be performed as an atomic operation.
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> lash: Is it possible to set up the equation so that we avoid the case of having to handle overshoot in a special wallet; does it help to define the token issuance as the target instead of the amount of reserve?
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* A public depthBump Funcation is added to the converter contract which takes in reserve R1
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* A public depthBump Funcation is added to the converter contract which takes in reserve R1
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* Calculate the multiple to teh reserve (R1/R0) and mint an amount of tokens T1 = T0(R1/R0) - Where R0 and T0 are the inital amount of reserve and supply
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* Calculate the multiple to teh reserve (R1/R0) and mint an amount of tokens T1 = T0(R1/R0) - Where R0 and T0 are the inital amount of reserve and supply
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* Calculate the amount of tokens (Tc) that would have been created on the bonding curve due to R1.
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* Calculate the amount of tokens (Tc) that would have been created on the bonding curve due to R1.
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@ -51,11 +44,6 @@ A donor in this case can choose to always get back as many CICs as they add to r
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* Amount of Reserve to add R1 8,000,000
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* Amount of Reserve to add R1 8,000,000
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* A community Pool account (for excess) in the constructor of the converter contract
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* A community Pool account (for excess) in the constructor of the converter contract
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> lash: Who would have spend access to this community pool, and how?
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> lash: Is the community pool the only source of "basic income / usage bonus"?
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* Note taht this pool may be used for other system functions like rewards and holding fees
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* Note taht this pool may be used for other system functions like rewards and holding fees
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### Interface (CLI)
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### Interface (CLI)
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