openethereum/accounts/ethkey/src/crypto.rs

// Copyright 2015-2020 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of OpenEthereum.

// OpenEthereum is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.

// OpenEthereum is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.

// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with OpenEthereum.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

#![allow(deprecated)]

use parity_crypto::error::SymmError;
use secp256k1;
use std::io;

quick_error! {
    #[derive(Debug)]
    pub enum Error {
        Secp(e: secp256k1::Error) {
            display("secp256k1 error: {}", e)
            cause(e)
            from()
        }
        Io(e: io::Error) {
            display("i/o error: {}", e)
            cause(e)
            from()
        }
        InvalidMessage {
            display("invalid message")
        }
        Symm(e: SymmError) {
            cause(e)
            from()
        }
    }
}

/// ECDH functions
pub mod ecdh {
    use super::Error;
    use secp256k1::{self, ecdh, key};
    use Public;
    use Secret;
    use SECP256K1;

    /// Agree on a shared secret
    pub fn agree(secret: &Secret, public: &Public) -> Result<Secret, Error> {
        let context = &SECP256K1;
        let pdata = {
            let mut temp = [4u8; 65];
            (&mut temp[1..65]).copy_from_slice(&public[0..64]);
            temp
        };

        let publ = key::PublicKey::from_slice(context, &pdata)?;
        let sec = key::SecretKey::from_slice(context, &secret)?;
        let shared = ecdh::SharedSecret::new_raw(context, &publ, &sec);

        Secret::from_unsafe_slice(&shared[0..32])
            .map_err(|_| Error::Secp(secp256k1::Error::InvalidSecretKey))
    }
}

/// ECIES function
pub mod ecies {
    use super::{ecdh, Error};
    use ethereum_types::H128;
    use parity_crypto::{aes, digest, hmac, is_equal};
    use Generator;
    use Public;
    use Random;
    use Secret;

    /// Encrypt a message with a public key, writing an HMAC covering both
    /// the plaintext and authenticated data.
    ///
    /// Authenticated data may be empty.
    pub fn encrypt(public: &Public, auth_data: &[u8], plain: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
        let r = Random.generate()?;
        let z = ecdh::agree(r.secret(), public)?;
        let mut key = [0u8; 32];
        kdf(&z, &[0u8; 0], &mut key);

        let ekey = &key[0..16];
        let mkey = hmac::SigKey::sha256(&digest::sha256(&key[16..32]));

        let mut msg = vec![0u8; 1 + 64 + 16 + plain.len() + 32];
        msg[0] = 0x04u8;
        {
            let msgd = &mut msg[1..];
            msgd[0..64].copy_from_slice(r.public());
            let iv = H128::random();
            msgd[64..80].copy_from_slice(&iv);
            {
                let cipher = &mut msgd[(64 + 16)..(64 + 16 + plain.len())];
                aes::encrypt_128_ctr(ekey, &iv, plain, cipher)?;
            }
            let mut hmac = hmac::Signer::with(&mkey);
            {
                let cipher_iv = &msgd[64..(64 + 16 + plain.len())];
                hmac.update(cipher_iv);
            }
            hmac.update(auth_data);
            let sig = hmac.sign();
            msgd[(64 + 16 + plain.len())..].copy_from_slice(&sig);
        }
        Ok(msg)
    }

    /// Decrypt a message with a secret key, checking HMAC for ciphertext
    /// and authenticated data validity.
    pub fn decrypt(secret: &Secret, auth_data: &[u8], encrypted: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
        let meta_len = 1 + 64 + 16 + 32;
        if encrypted.len() < meta_len || encrypted[0] < 2 || encrypted[0] > 4 {
            return Err(Error::InvalidMessage); //invalid message: publickey
        }

        let e = &encrypted[1..];
        let p = Public::from_slice(&e[0..64]);
        let z = ecdh::agree(secret, &p)?;
        let mut key = [0u8; 32];
        kdf(&z, &[0u8; 0], &mut key);

        let ekey = &key[0..16];
        let mkey = hmac::SigKey::sha256(&digest::sha256(&key[16..32]));

        let clen = encrypted.len() - meta_len;
        let cipher_with_iv = &e[64..(64 + 16 + clen)];
        let cipher_iv = &cipher_with_iv[0..16];
        let cipher_no_iv = &cipher_with_iv[16..];
        let msg_mac = &e[(64 + 16 + clen)..];

        // Verify tag
        let mut hmac = hmac::Signer::with(&mkey);
        hmac.update(cipher_with_iv);
        hmac.update(auth_data);
        let mac = hmac.sign();

        if !is_equal(&mac.as_ref()[..], msg_mac) {
            return Err(Error::InvalidMessage);
        }

        let mut msg = vec![0u8; clen];
        aes::decrypt_128_ctr(ekey, cipher_iv, cipher_no_iv, &mut msg[..])?;
        Ok(msg)
    }

    fn kdf(secret: &Secret, s1: &[u8], dest: &mut [u8]) {
        // SEC/ISO/Shoup specify counter size SHOULD be equivalent
        // to size of hash output, however, it also notes that
        // the 4 bytes is okay. NIST specifies 4 bytes.
        let mut ctr = 1u32;
        let mut written = 0usize;
        while written < dest.len() {
            let mut hasher = digest::Hasher::sha256();
            let ctrs = [
                (ctr >> 24) as u8,
                (ctr >> 16) as u8,
                (ctr >> 8) as u8,
                ctr as u8,
            ];
            hasher.update(&ctrs);
            hasher.update(secret);
            hasher.update(s1);
            let d = hasher.finish();
            &mut dest[written..(written + 32)].copy_from_slice(&d);
            written += 32;
            ctr += 1;
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::ecies;
    use Generator;
    use Random;

    #[test]
    fn ecies_shared() {
        let kp = Random.generate().unwrap();
        let message = b"So many books, so little time";

        let shared = b"shared";
        let wrong_shared = b"incorrect";
        let encrypted = ecies::encrypt(kp.public(), shared, message).unwrap();
        assert!(encrypted[..] != message[..]);
        assert_eq!(encrypted[0], 0x04);

        assert!(ecies::decrypt(kp.secret(), wrong_shared, &encrypted).is_err());
        let decrypted = ecies::decrypt(kp.secret(), shared, &encrypted).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decrypted[..message.len()], message[..]);
    }
}