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Remove ethcrypto::{en,de}crypt_single_message. (#8126)

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Both functions are no longer in use within the parity code base.
This commit is contained in:
Toralf Wittner 2018-03-16 08:48:46 +01:00 committed by Niklas Adolfsson
parent 6f5bd845ad
commit c737056000
1 changed files with 1 additions and 65 deletions
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66
ethcrypto/src/lib.rs
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@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ pub mod ecies {
use rcrypto::mac::Mac;
use ethereum_types::H128;
use ethkey::{Random, Generator, Public, Secret};
use {Error, ecdh, aes, Keccak256};
use {Error, ecdh, aes};
/// Encrypt a message with a public key, writing an HMAC covering both
/// the plaintext and authenticated data.
@ -247,33 +247,6 @@ pub mod ecies {
Ok(msg)
}
/// Encrypt a message with a public key and no HMAC
pub fn encrypt_single_message(public: &Public, plain: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let r = Random.generate()
.expect("context known to have key-generation capabilities");
let z = ecdh::agree(r.secret(), public)?;
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut mkey = [0u8; 32];
kdf(&z, &[0u8; 0], &mut key);
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
let mkey_material = &key[16..32];
hasher.input(mkey_material);
hasher.result(&mut mkey);
let ekey = &key[0..16];
let mut msgd = vec![0u8; 64 + plain.len()];
{
r.public().copy_to(&mut msgd[0..64]);
let iv = H128::from_slice(&z.keccak256()[0..16]);
{
let cipher = &mut msgd[64..(64 + plain.len())];
aes::encrypt(ekey, &iv, plain, cipher);
}
}
Ok(msgd)
}
/// Decrypt a message with a secret key, checking HMAC for ciphertext
/// and authenticated data validity.
pub fn decrypt(secret: &Secret, auth_data: &[u8], encrypted: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
@ -317,33 +290,6 @@ pub mod ecies {
Ok(msg)
}
/// Decrypt single message with a secret key and no HMAC.
pub fn decrypt_single_message(secret: &Secret, encrypted: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let meta_len = 64;
if encrypted.len() < meta_len {
return Err(Error::InvalidMessage); //invalid message: publickey
}
let e = encrypted;
let p = Public::from_slice(&e[0..64]);
let z = ecdh::agree(secret, &p)?;
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
kdf(&z, &[0u8; 0], &mut key);
let ekey = &key[0..16];
let mkey_material = &key[16..32];
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
let mut mkey = [0u8; 32];
hasher.input(mkey_material);
hasher.result(&mut mkey);
let clen = encrypted.len() - meta_len;
let cipher = &e[64..(64+clen)];
let mut msg = vec![0u8; clen];
let iv = H128::from_slice(&z.keccak256()[0..16]);
aes::decrypt(ekey, &iv, cipher, &mut msg[..]);
Ok(msg)
}
fn kdf(secret: &Secret, s1: &[u8], dest: &mut [u8]) {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
// SEC/ISO/Shoup specify counter size SHOULD be equivalent
@ -384,15 +330,5 @@ mod tests {
let decrypted = ecies::decrypt(kp.secret(), shared, &encrypted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted[..message.len()], message[..]);
}
#[test]
fn ecies_shared_single() {
let kp = Random.generate().unwrap();
let message = b"So many books, so little time";
let encrypted = ecies::encrypt_single_message(kp.public(), message).unwrap();
assert!(encrypted[..] != message[..]);
let decrypted = ecies::decrypt_single_message(kp.secret(), &encrypted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted[..message.len()], message[..]);
}
}