Consolidate crypto functionality in ethcore-crypto. (#8432)

* Consolidate crypto functionality in `ethcore-crypto`.

- Move `ecdh`/`ecies` modules to `ethkey`.
- Refactor `ethcore-crypto` to use file per module.
- Replace `subtle` with `ethcore_crypto::is_equal`.
- Add `aes_gcm` module to `ethcore-crypto`.

* Rename `aes::{encrypt,decrypt,decrypt_cbc}` ...

... to `aes::{encrypt_128_ctr,decrypt_128_ctr,decrypt_128_cbc}`.
This commit is contained in:
Toralf Wittner
2018-05-05 11:02:33 +02:00
committed by Marek Kotewicz
parent a4c7843a07
commit e30839e85f
50 changed files with 1003 additions and 542 deletions

54
ethcore/crypto/src/aes.rs Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
// Copyright 2015-2017 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of Parity.
// Parity is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// Parity is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Parity. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
use error::SymmError;
use rcrypto::blockmodes::{CtrMode, CbcDecryptor, PkcsPadding};
use rcrypto::aessafe::{AesSafe128Encryptor, AesSafe128Decryptor};
use rcrypto::symmetriccipher::{Encryptor, Decryptor};
use rcrypto::buffer::{RefReadBuffer, RefWriteBuffer, WriteBuffer};
/// Encrypt a message (CTR mode).
///
/// Key (`k`) length and initialisation vector (`iv`) length have to be 16 bytes each.
/// An error is returned if the input lengths are invalid.
pub fn encrypt_128_ctr(k: &[u8], iv: &[u8], plain: &[u8], dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), SymmError> {
let mut encryptor = CtrMode::new(AesSafe128Encryptor::new(k), iv.to_vec());
encryptor.encrypt(&mut RefReadBuffer::new(plain), &mut RefWriteBuffer::new(dest), true)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Decrypt a message (CTR mode).
///
/// Key (`k`) length and initialisation vector (`iv`) length have to be 16 bytes each.
/// An error is returned if the input lengths are invalid.
pub fn decrypt_128_ctr(k: &[u8], iv: &[u8], encrypted: &[u8], dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), SymmError> {
let mut encryptor = CtrMode::new(AesSafe128Encryptor::new(k), iv.to_vec());
encryptor.decrypt(&mut RefReadBuffer::new(encrypted), &mut RefWriteBuffer::new(dest), true)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Decrypt a message (CBC mode).
///
/// Key (`k`) length and initialisation vector (`iv`) length have to be 16 bytes each.
/// An error is returned if the input lengths are invalid.
pub fn decrypt_128_cbc(k: &[u8], iv: &[u8], encrypted: &[u8], dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize, SymmError> {
let mut encryptor = CbcDecryptor::new(AesSafe128Decryptor::new(k), PkcsPadding, iv.to_vec());
let len = dest.len();
let mut buffer = RefWriteBuffer::new(dest);
encryptor.decrypt(&mut RefReadBuffer::new(encrypted), &mut buffer, true)?;
Ok(len - buffer.remaining())
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
// Copyright 2015-2017 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of Parity.
// Parity is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// Parity is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Parity. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
use error::SymmError;
use ring;
enum Mode { Aes128Gcm, Aes256Gcm }
/// AES GCM encryptor.
pub struct Encryptor<'a> {
mode: Mode,
key: ring::aead::SealingKey,
ad: &'a [u8],
offset: usize,
}
impl<'a> Encryptor<'a> {
pub fn aes_128_gcm(key: &[u8; 16]) -> Result<Encryptor<'a>, SymmError> {
let sk = ring::aead::SealingKey::new(&ring::aead::AES_128_GCM, key)?;
Ok(Encryptor {
mode: Mode::Aes128Gcm,
key: sk,
ad: &[],
offset: 0,
})
}
pub fn aes_256_gcm(key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Encryptor<'a>, SymmError> {
let sk = ring::aead::SealingKey::new(&ring::aead::AES_256_GCM, key)?;
Ok(Encryptor {
mode: Mode::Aes256Gcm,
key: sk,
ad: &[],
offset: 0,
})
}
/// Optional associated data which is not encrypted but authenticated.
pub fn associate(&mut self, data: &'a [u8]) -> &mut Self {
self.ad = data;
self
}
/// Optional offset value. Only the slice `[offset..]` will be encrypted.
pub fn offset(&mut self, off: usize) -> &mut Self {
self.offset = off;
self
}
/// Please note that the pair (key, nonce) must never be reused. Using random nonces
/// limits the number of messages encrypted with the same key to 2^32 (cf. [[1]])
///
/// [1]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf
pub fn encrypt(&self, nonce: &[u8; 12], mut data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SymmError> {
if self.offset > data.len() {
return Err(SymmError::offset_error(self.offset))
}
let tag_len = match self.mode {
Mode::Aes128Gcm => ring::aead::AES_128_GCM.tag_len(),
Mode::Aes256Gcm => ring::aead::AES_256_GCM.tag_len(),
};
data.extend(::std::iter::repeat(0).take(tag_len));
let len = ring::aead::seal_in_place(&self.key, nonce, self.ad, &mut data[self.offset ..], tag_len)?;
data.truncate(self.offset + len);
Ok(data)
}
}
/// AES GCM decryptor.
pub struct Decryptor<'a> {
key: ring::aead::OpeningKey,
ad: &'a [u8],
offset: usize,
}
impl<'a> Decryptor<'a> {
pub fn aes_128_gcm(key: &[u8; 16]) -> Result<Decryptor<'a>, SymmError> {
let ok = ring::aead::OpeningKey::new(&ring::aead::AES_128_GCM, key)?;
Ok(Decryptor {
key: ok,
ad: &[],
offset: 0,
})
}
pub fn aes_256_gcm(key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Decryptor<'a>, SymmError> {
let ok = ring::aead::OpeningKey::new(&ring::aead::AES_256_GCM, key)?;
Ok(Decryptor {
key: ok,
ad: &[],
offset: 0,
})
}
/// Optional associated data which is not encrypted but authenticated.
pub fn associate(&mut self, data: &'a [u8]) -> &mut Self {
self.ad = data;
self
}
/// Optional offset value. Only the slice `[offset..]` will be decrypted.
pub fn offset(&mut self, off: usize) -> &mut Self {
self.offset = off;
self
}
pub fn decrypt(&self, nonce: &[u8; 12], mut data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SymmError> {
if self.offset > data.len() {
return Err(SymmError::offset_error(self.offset))
}
let len = ring::aead::open_in_place(&self.key, nonce, self.ad, 0, &mut data[self.offset ..])?.len();
data.truncate(self.offset + len);
Ok(data)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{Encryptor, Decryptor};
#[test]
fn aes_gcm_128() {
let secret = b"1234567890123456";
let nonce = b"123456789012";
let message = b"So many books, so little time";
let ciphertext = Encryptor::aes_128_gcm(secret)
.unwrap()
.encrypt(nonce, message.to_vec())
.unwrap();
assert!(ciphertext != message);
let plaintext = Decryptor::aes_128_gcm(secret)
.unwrap()
.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext, message)
}
#[test]
fn aes_gcm_256() {
let secret = b"12345678901234567890123456789012";
let nonce = b"123456789012";
let message = b"So many books, so little time";
let ciphertext = Encryptor::aes_256_gcm(secret)
.unwrap()
.encrypt(nonce, message.to_vec())
.unwrap();
assert!(ciphertext != message);
let plaintext = Decryptor::aes_256_gcm(secret)
.unwrap()
.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext, message)
}
#[test]
fn aes_gcm_256_offset() {
let secret = b"12345678901234567890123456789012";
let nonce = b"123456789012";
let message = b"prefix data; So many books, so little time";
let ciphertext = Encryptor::aes_256_gcm(secret)
.unwrap()
.offset(13) // length of "prefix data; "
.encrypt(nonce, message.to_vec())
.unwrap();
assert!(ciphertext != &message[..]);
let plaintext = Decryptor::aes_256_gcm(secret)
.unwrap()
.offset(13) // length of "prefix data; "
.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext, &message[..])
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
// Copyright 2018 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of Parity.
// Parity is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// Parity is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Parity. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
use rcrypto::ripemd160;
use ring::digest::{self, Context, SHA256, SHA512};
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use std::ops::Deref;
/// The message digest.
pub struct Digest<T>(InnerDigest, PhantomData<T>);
enum InnerDigest {
Ring(digest::Digest),
Ripemd160([u8; 20]),
}
impl<T> Deref for Digest<T> {
type Target = [u8];
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
match self.0 {
InnerDigest::Ring(ref d) => d.as_ref(),
InnerDigest::Ripemd160(ref d) => &d[..]
}
}
}
/// Single-step sha256 digest computation.
pub fn sha256(data: &[u8]) -> Digest<Sha256> {
Digest(InnerDigest::Ring(digest::digest(&SHA256, data)), PhantomData)
}
/// Single-step sha512 digest computation.
pub fn sha512(data: &[u8]) -> Digest<Sha512> {
Digest(InnerDigest::Ring(digest::digest(&SHA512, data)), PhantomData)
}
/// Single-step ripemd160 digest computation.
pub fn ripemd160(data: &[u8]) -> Digest<Ripemd160> {
let mut hasher = Hasher::ripemd160();
hasher.update(data);
hasher.finish()
}
pub enum Sha256 {}
pub enum Sha512 {}
pub enum Ripemd160 {}
/// Stateful digest computation.
pub struct Hasher<T>(Inner, PhantomData<T>);
enum Inner {
Ring(Context),
Ripemd160(ripemd160::Ripemd160)
}
impl Hasher<Sha256> {
pub fn sha256() -> Hasher<Sha256> {
Hasher(Inner::Ring(Context::new(&SHA256)), PhantomData)
}
}
impl Hasher<Sha512> {
pub fn sha512() -> Hasher<Sha512> {
Hasher(Inner::Ring(Context::new(&SHA512)), PhantomData)
}
}
impl Hasher<Ripemd160> {
pub fn ripemd160() -> Hasher<Ripemd160> {
Hasher(Inner::Ripemd160(ripemd160::Ripemd160::new()), PhantomData)
}
}
impl<T> Hasher<T> {
pub fn update(&mut self, data: &[u8]) {
match self.0 {
Inner::Ring(ref mut ctx) => ctx.update(data),
Inner::Ripemd160(ref mut ctx) => {
use rcrypto::digest::Digest;
ctx.input(data)
}
}
}
pub fn finish(self) -> Digest<T> {
match self.0 {
Inner::Ring(ctx) => Digest(InnerDigest::Ring(ctx.finish()), PhantomData),
Inner::Ripemd160(mut ctx) => {
use rcrypto::digest::Digest;
let mut d = [0; 20];
ctx.result(&mut d);
Digest(InnerDigest::Ripemd160(d), PhantomData)
}
}
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
// Copyright 2015-2017 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of Parity.
// Parity is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// Parity is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Parity. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
use rcrypto;
use ring;
quick_error! {
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum Error {
Scrypt(e: ScryptError) {
cause(e)
from()
}
Symm(e: SymmError) {
cause(e)
from()
}
}
}
quick_error! {
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum ScryptError {
// log(N) < r / 16
InvalidN {
display("Invalid N argument of the scrypt encryption")
}
// p <= (2^31-1 * 32)/(128 * r)
InvalidP {
display("Invalid p argument of the scrypt encryption")
}
}
}
quick_error! {
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum SymmError wraps PrivSymmErr {
RustCrypto(e: rcrypto::symmetriccipher::SymmetricCipherError) {
display("symmetric crypto error")
from()
}
Ring(e: ring::error::Unspecified) {
display("symmetric crypto error")
cause(e)
from()
}
Offset(x: usize) {
display("offset {} greater than slice length", x)
}
}
}
impl SymmError {
pub(crate) fn offset_error(x: usize) -> SymmError {
SymmError(PrivSymmErr::Offset(x))
}
}
impl From<ring::error::Unspecified> for SymmError {
fn from(e: ring::error::Unspecified) -> SymmError {
SymmError(PrivSymmErr::Ring(e))
}
}
impl From<rcrypto::symmetriccipher::SymmetricCipherError> for SymmError {
fn from(e: rcrypto::symmetriccipher::SymmetricCipherError) -> SymmError {
SymmError(PrivSymmErr::RustCrypto(e))
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
// Copyright 2018 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of Parity.
// Parity is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// Parity is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Parity. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
use digest;
use ring::digest::{SHA256, SHA512};
use ring::hmac::{self, SigningContext};
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use std::ops::Deref;
/// HMAC signature.
pub struct Signature<T>(hmac::Signature, PhantomData<T>);
impl<T> Deref for Signature<T> {
type Target = [u8];
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
self.0.as_ref()
}
}
/// HMAC signing key.
pub struct SigKey<T>(hmac::SigningKey, PhantomData<T>);
impl SigKey<digest::Sha256> {
pub fn sha256(key: &[u8]) -> SigKey<digest::Sha256> {
SigKey(hmac::SigningKey::new(&SHA256, key), PhantomData)
}
}
impl SigKey<digest::Sha512> {
pub fn sha512(key: &[u8]) -> SigKey<digest::Sha512> {
SigKey(hmac::SigningKey::new(&SHA512, key), PhantomData)
}
}
/// Compute HMAC signature of `data`.
pub fn sign<T>(k: &SigKey<T>, data: &[u8]) -> Signature<T> {
Signature(hmac::sign(&k.0, data), PhantomData)
}
/// Stateful HMAC computation.
pub struct Signer<T>(SigningContext, PhantomData<T>);
impl<T> Signer<T> {
pub fn with(key: &SigKey<T>) -> Signer<T> {
Signer(hmac::SigningContext::with_key(&key.0), PhantomData)
}
pub fn update(&mut self, data: &[u8]) {
self.0.update(data)
}
pub fn sign(self) -> Signature<T> {
Signature(self.0.sign(), PhantomData)
}
}
/// HMAC signature verification key.
pub struct VerifyKey<T>(hmac::VerificationKey, PhantomData<T>);
impl VerifyKey<digest::Sha256> {
pub fn sha256(key: &[u8]) -> VerifyKey<digest::Sha256> {
VerifyKey(hmac::VerificationKey::new(&SHA256, key), PhantomData)
}
}
impl VerifyKey<digest::Sha512> {
pub fn sha512(key: &[u8]) -> VerifyKey<digest::Sha512> {
VerifyKey(hmac::VerificationKey::new(&SHA512, key), PhantomData)
}
}
/// Verify HMAC signature of `data`.
pub fn verify<T>(k: &VerifyKey<T>, data: &[u8], sig: &[u8]) -> bool {
hmac::verify(&k.0, data, sig).is_ok()
}

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@@ -18,23 +18,22 @@
extern crate crypto as rcrypto;
extern crate ethereum_types;
extern crate subtle;
#[macro_use]
extern crate quick_error;
extern crate ring;
extern crate tiny_keccak;
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
extern crate secp256k1;
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
extern crate ethkey;
pub mod aes;
pub mod aes_gcm;
pub mod error;
pub mod scrypt;
pub mod digest;
pub mod hmac;
pub mod pbkdf2;
pub use error::Error;
use std::fmt;
use tiny_keccak::Keccak;
use rcrypto::pbkdf2::pbkdf2;
use rcrypto::scrypt::{scrypt, ScryptParams};
use rcrypto::sha2::Sha256;
use rcrypto::hmac::Hmac;
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
use secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
pub const KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32;
pub const KEY_ITERATIONS: usize = 10240;
@@ -43,65 +42,6 @@ pub const KEY_LENGTH_AES: usize = KEY_LENGTH / 2;
/// Default authenticated data to use (in RPC).
pub const DEFAULT_MAC: [u8; 2] = [0, 0];
#[derive(PartialEq, Debug)]
pub enum ScryptError {
// log(N) < r / 16
InvalidN,
// p <= (2^31-1 * 32)/(128 * r)
InvalidP,
}
impl fmt::Display for ScryptError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
let s = match *self {
ScryptError::InvalidN => "Invalid N argument of the scrypt encryption" ,
ScryptError::InvalidP => "Invalid p argument of the scrypt encryption",
};
write!(f, "{}", s)
}
}
#[derive(PartialEq, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
Secp(SecpError),
Scrypt(ScryptError),
InvalidMessage,
}
impl From<ScryptError> for Error {
fn from(err: ScryptError) -> Self {
Error::Scrypt(err)
}
}
impl fmt::Display for Error {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
let s = match *self {
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
Error::Secp(ref err) => err.to_string(),
Error::Scrypt(ref err) => err.to_string(),
Error::InvalidMessage => "Invalid message".into(),
};
write!(f, "{}", s)
}
}
impl Into<String> for Error {
fn into(self) -> String {
format!("{}", self)
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
impl From<SecpError> for Error {
fn from(e: SecpError) -> Self {
Error::Secp(e)
}
}
pub trait Keccak256<T> {
fn keccak256(&self) -> T where T: Sized;
}
@@ -117,33 +57,13 @@ impl<T> Keccak256<[u8; 32]> for T where T: AsRef<[u8]> {
}
pub fn derive_key_iterations(password: &str, salt: &[u8; 32], c: u32) -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
let mut h_mac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), password.as_bytes());
let mut derived_key = vec![0u8; KEY_LENGTH];
pbkdf2(&mut h_mac, salt, c, &mut derived_key);
let mut derived_key = [0u8; KEY_LENGTH];
pbkdf2::sha256(c, pbkdf2::Salt(salt), pbkdf2::Secret(password.as_bytes()), &mut derived_key);
let derived_right_bits = &derived_key[0..KEY_LENGTH_AES];
let derived_left_bits = &derived_key[KEY_LENGTH_AES..KEY_LENGTH];
(derived_right_bits.to_vec(), derived_left_bits.to_vec())
}
pub fn derive_key_scrypt(password: &str, salt: &[u8; 32], n: u32, p: u32, r: u32) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), Error> {
// sanity checks
let log_n = (32 - n.leading_zeros() - 1) as u8;
if log_n as u32 >= r * 16 {
return Err(Error::Scrypt(ScryptError::InvalidN));
}
if p as u64 > ((u32::max_value() as u64 - 1) * 32)/(128 * (r as u64)) {
return Err(Error::Scrypt(ScryptError::InvalidP));
}
let mut derived_key = vec![0u8; KEY_LENGTH];
let scrypt_params = ScryptParams::new(log_n, r, p);
scrypt(password.as_bytes(), salt, &scrypt_params, &mut derived_key);
let derived_right_bits = &derived_key[0..KEY_LENGTH_AES];
let derived_left_bits = &derived_key[KEY_LENGTH_AES..KEY_LENGTH];
Ok((derived_right_bits.to_vec(), derived_left_bits.to_vec()))
}
pub fn derive_mac(derived_left_bits: &[u8], cipher_text: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut mac = vec![0u8; KEY_LENGTH_AES + cipher_text.len()];
mac[0..KEY_LENGTH_AES].copy_from_slice(derived_left_bits);
@@ -151,194 +71,7 @@ pub fn derive_mac(derived_left_bits: &[u8], cipher_text: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
mac
}
/// AES encryption
pub mod aes {
use rcrypto::blockmodes::{CtrMode, CbcDecryptor, PkcsPadding};
use rcrypto::aessafe::{AesSafe128Encryptor, AesSafe128Decryptor};
use rcrypto::symmetriccipher::{Encryptor, Decryptor, SymmetricCipherError};
use rcrypto::buffer::{RefReadBuffer, RefWriteBuffer, WriteBuffer};
/// Encrypt a message (CTR mode)
pub fn encrypt(k: &[u8], iv: &[u8], plain: &[u8], dest: &mut [u8]) {
let mut encryptor = CtrMode::new(AesSafe128Encryptor::new(k), iv.to_vec());
encryptor.encrypt(&mut RefReadBuffer::new(plain), &mut RefWriteBuffer::new(dest), true).expect("Invalid length or padding");
}
/// Decrypt a message (CTR mode)
pub fn decrypt(k: &[u8], iv: &[u8], encrypted: &[u8], dest: &mut [u8]) {
let mut encryptor = CtrMode::new(AesSafe128Encryptor::new(k), iv.to_vec());
encryptor.decrypt(&mut RefReadBuffer::new(encrypted), &mut RefWriteBuffer::new(dest), true).expect("Invalid length or padding");
}
/// Decrypt a message using cbc mode
pub fn decrypt_cbc(k: &[u8], iv: &[u8], encrypted: &[u8], dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize, SymmetricCipherError> {
let mut encryptor = CbcDecryptor::new(AesSafe128Decryptor::new(k), PkcsPadding, iv.to_vec());
let len = dest.len();
let mut buffer = RefWriteBuffer::new(dest);
encryptor.decrypt(&mut RefReadBuffer::new(encrypted), &mut buffer, true)?;
Ok(len - buffer.remaining())
}
}
/// ECDH functions
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
pub mod ecdh {
use secp256k1::{ecdh, key, Error as SecpError};
use ethkey::{Secret, Public, SECP256K1};
use Error;
/// Agree on a shared secret
pub fn agree(secret: &Secret, public: &Public) -> Result<Secret, Error> {
let context = &SECP256K1;
let pdata = {
let mut temp = [4u8; 65];
(&mut temp[1..65]).copy_from_slice(&public[0..64]);
temp
};
let publ = key::PublicKey::from_slice(context, &pdata)?;
let sec = key::SecretKey::from_slice(context, &secret)?;
let shared = ecdh::SharedSecret::new_raw(context, &publ, &sec);
Secret::from_unsafe_slice(&shared[0..32])
.map_err(|_| Error::Secp(SecpError::InvalidSecretKey))
}
}
/// ECIES function
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
pub mod ecies {
use rcrypto::digest::Digest;
use rcrypto::sha2::Sha256;
use rcrypto::hmac::Hmac;
use rcrypto::mac::Mac;
use ethereum_types::H128;
use ethkey::{Random, Generator, Public, Secret};
use {Error, ecdh, aes};
/// Encrypt a message with a public key, writing an HMAC covering both
/// the plaintext and authenticated data.
///
/// Authenticated data may be empty.
pub fn encrypt(public: &Public, auth_data: &[u8], plain: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let r = Random.generate()
.expect("context known to have key-generation capabilities; qed");
let z = ecdh::agree(r.secret(), public)?;
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut mkey = [0u8; 32];
kdf(&z, &[0u8; 0], &mut key);
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
let mkey_material = &key[16..32];
hasher.input(mkey_material);
hasher.result(&mut mkey);
let ekey = &key[0..16];
let mut msg = vec![0u8; 1 + 64 + 16 + plain.len() + 32];
msg[0] = 0x04u8;
{
let msgd = &mut msg[1..];
msgd[0..64].copy_from_slice(r.public());
let iv = H128::random();
msgd[64..80].copy_from_slice(&iv);
{
let cipher = &mut msgd[(64 + 16)..(64 + 16 + plain.len())];
aes::encrypt(ekey, &iv, plain, cipher);
}
let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mkey);
{
let cipher_iv = &msgd[64..(64 + 16 + plain.len())];
hmac.input(cipher_iv);
}
hmac.input(auth_data);
hmac.raw_result(&mut msgd[(64 + 16 + plain.len())..]);
}
Ok(msg)
}
/// Decrypt a message with a secret key, checking HMAC for ciphertext
/// and authenticated data validity.
pub fn decrypt(secret: &Secret, auth_data: &[u8], encrypted: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let meta_len = 1 + 64 + 16 + 32;
if encrypted.len() < meta_len || encrypted[0] < 2 || encrypted[0] > 4 {
return Err(Error::InvalidMessage); //invalid message: publickey
}
let e = &encrypted[1..];
let p = Public::from_slice(&e[0..64]);
let z = ecdh::agree(secret, &p)?;
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
kdf(&z, &[0u8; 0], &mut key);
let ekey = &key[0..16];
let mkey_material = &key[16..32];
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
let mut mkey = [0u8; 32];
hasher.input(mkey_material);
hasher.result(&mut mkey);
let clen = encrypted.len() - meta_len;
let cipher_with_iv = &e[64..(64+16+clen)];
let cipher_iv = &cipher_with_iv[0..16];
let cipher_no_iv = &cipher_with_iv[16..];
let msg_mac = &e[(64+16+clen)..];
// Verify tag
let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mkey);
hmac.input(cipher_with_iv);
hmac.input(auth_data);
let mut mac = [0u8; 32];
hmac.raw_result(&mut mac);
// constant time compare to avoid timing attack.
if ::subtle::slices_equal(&mac[..], msg_mac) != 1 {
return Err(Error::InvalidMessage);
}
let mut msg = vec![0u8; clen];
aes::decrypt(ekey, cipher_iv, cipher_no_iv, &mut msg[..]);
Ok(msg)
}
fn kdf(secret: &Secret, s1: &[u8], dest: &mut [u8]) {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
// SEC/ISO/Shoup specify counter size SHOULD be equivalent
// to size of hash output, however, it also notes that
// the 4 bytes is okay. NIST specifies 4 bytes.
let mut ctr = 1u32;
let mut written = 0usize;
while written < dest.len() {
let ctrs = [(ctr >> 24) as u8, (ctr >> 16) as u8, (ctr >> 8) as u8, ctr as u8];
hasher.input(&ctrs);
hasher.input(secret);
hasher.input(s1);
hasher.result(&mut dest[written..(written + 32)]);
hasher.reset();
written += 32;
ctr += 1;
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use ethkey::{Random, Generator};
use ecies;
#[test]
fn ecies_shared() {
let kp = Random.generate().unwrap();
let message = b"So many books, so little time";
let shared = b"shared";
let wrong_shared = b"incorrect";
let encrypted = ecies::encrypt(kp.public(), shared, message).unwrap();
assert!(encrypted[..] != message[..]);
assert_eq!(encrypted[0], 0x04);
assert!(ecies::decrypt(kp.secret(), wrong_shared, &encrypted).is_err());
let decrypted = ecies::decrypt(kp.secret(), shared, &encrypted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted[..message.len()], message[..]);
}
pub fn is_equal(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
ring::constant_time::verify_slices_are_equal(a, b).is_ok()
}

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// Copyright 2018 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of Parity.
// Parity is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// Parity is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Parity. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
use ring;
pub struct Salt<'a>(pub &'a [u8]);
pub struct Secret<'a>(pub &'a [u8]);
pub fn sha256(iter: u32, salt: Salt, sec: Secret, out: &mut [u8; 32]) {
ring::pbkdf2::derive(&ring::digest::SHA256, iter, salt.0, sec.0, &mut out[..])
}
pub fn sha512(iter: u32, salt: Salt, sec: Secret, out: &mut [u8; 64]) {
ring::pbkdf2::derive(&ring::digest::SHA512, iter, salt.0, sec.0, &mut out[..])
}

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// Copyright 2015-2017 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of Parity.
// Parity is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// Parity is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Parity. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
use error::ScryptError;
use rcrypto::scrypt::{scrypt, ScryptParams};
use super::{KEY_LENGTH_AES, KEY_LENGTH};
pub fn derive_key(pass: &str, salt: &[u8; 32], n: u32, p: u32, r: u32) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), ScryptError> {
// sanity checks
let log_n = (32 - n.leading_zeros() - 1) as u8;
if log_n as u32 >= r * 16 {
return Err(ScryptError::InvalidN);
}
if p as u64 > ((u32::max_value() as u64 - 1) * 32)/(128 * (r as u64)) {
return Err(ScryptError::InvalidP);
}
let mut derived_key = vec![0u8; KEY_LENGTH];
let scrypt_params = ScryptParams::new(log_n, r, p);
scrypt(pass.as_bytes(), salt, &scrypt_params, &mut derived_key);
let derived_right_bits = &derived_key[0..KEY_LENGTH_AES];
let derived_left_bits = &derived_key[KEY_LENGTH_AES..KEY_LENGTH];
Ok((derived_right_bits.to_vec(), derived_left_bits.to_vec()))
}